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HEALTH CARE & PHARMACEUTICALS 
Health Care Reform and the Logic of 
Emergence 
M. Gregg Bloche & Sujata M. Jhaveri* 
Health policy wonks who get frustrated about the difficulty 
of doing health care reform often resort to the parable of the 
“boiled frog” to convey the dire consequences of failure. The 
story of the “boiled frog” (with a few embellishments) goes 
something like this: 
 
 A frog hops into a pot of water—or an experimenter with 
bad intentions puts him there. 
 The experimenter (who does not think much of animal 
rights activists) puts the pot on a stove and turns on the 
gas. 
 The water warms slowly. Because he is cold-blooded, the 
frog’s body temperature rises to match the water’s. 
 The frog does not notice that he—and the water—are 
getting warmer. He stays in the pot—he could hop out 
but he does not—until the water boils and he becomes 
part of our dinner. 
 
But there is a problem with the parable: researchers (with 
bad attitudes!) have actually done this to frogs. German 
physiologist Friedrich Goltz reported in 1869 that frogs 
immersed in cool water become jumpy, then quite agitated as 
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the water is warmed past room temperature.1 They, in fact, try 
desperately to escape, and do so if there is not a lid on the pot. 
Unless, that is, researchers (with worse attitudes!) first cut out 
their brains; then the frogs blithely disregard their progress 
toward the dinner table. 
So the parable of the boiled frog sells frogs short. Only 
brainless frogs do nothing, as we have done in health care 
policy. It is fitting that some concerned about climate change 
have also seized upon the frog parable, since our health care 
system is fast becoming the fiscal equivalent of global warming. 
Even as the number of people without medical coverage closes 
in on fifty million, we are on track towards spending fifty 
percent of our gross domestic product on medical care before 
this century comes to an end.2 So says the Congressional 
Budget Office, which points out the obvious: we are not really 
going to spend fifty percent of our GDP on health care.3 The 
consequences of doing so would be disastrous—for our fiscal 
stability, economic standing in the world, and other personal 
and national priorities. Something big will have to change. 
Calls for “cost-control” or even cost reduction fail to convey 
the challenge we face. Indeed, cost reductions of a one-time 
nature are, over the long term, almost beside the point. Take, 
for example, calls from political liberals for reductions in 
administrative costs (often blamed on private insurers) and 
calls from conservatives for reductions in costs arising from the 
medical malpractice system. Proposals along these lines might 
trim health spending by several or more percentage points, 
their advocates say. But this is a one-time-only savings—cost 
reduction that pales in comparison to the cumulative impact, 
                                                          
 1. Friedrich Goltz, BEITRAGE ZUR LEHRE VON DEN FUNCTIONEN DER 
NERVENCENTREN DES FROSCHES (1869). Michael Jones deserves credit for 
bringing this pearl to public attention in an Atlantic Magazine blog post, 
Michael Jones, Guest-post wisdom on frogs (July 21, 2009), 
http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/07/guest-
post_wisdom_on_frogs.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 2. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING 12 (2007). These CBO projections presume excess 
cost growth rates (rates by which medical cost increases exceed GDP growth 
for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending) that are well below 
historical averages. Id. at 10–11. Were medical costs to continue to rise at 
historical rates, health spending would soar to an unimaginable 100 percent of 
GDP within seventy-five years. Id. at App. D. 
 3. See id. at 1. (“In reality, federal law will change in the future, 
ensuring that the basis for the projections will not turn out to be correct.”). 
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over a decade or more, of annual medical spending increases of 
several percent or more. 
What will need to change is well-captured by the 
expression “Bending the Curve,” made popular among health 
policy wonks by an eponymous Commonwealth Fund report on 
cost-containment strategies, published in 2007.4 The challenge 
before us is not cost reduction; it is reduction in the rate at 
which health care spending is now rising. Health Care 
spending has been growing for a half century or more at rates 
several percentage points higher than inflation and GDP 
growth. There is broad agreement, based on extensive evidence, 
that this unsustainable rate of increase is not, in the main, due 
to medical price inflation, aging boomers, or avaricious insurers 
(rates of increase are not much higher in the U.S. than in 
industrialized countries where private medical insurance plays 
a lesser role5). Rather, this rate of increase is due to advances 
in medical technology, powered by scientific discoveries and 
availability of insurance (both public and private) to cover these 
advances’ costs. 
The challenge before us, if we are to “bend the curve,” is to 
put the brakes on this process, gently—without denying tens of 
millions of people access to a decent minimum of medical care 
and without cutting back on care senselessly, absent regard for 
comparative clinical benefit. Can the law of health care 
provision empower us to achieve this? 
Standard wisdom holds that health law is ill-situated to do 
so. Health law, it is widely thought, is part of the problem. 
American health law today is a chaotic and incomplete 
patchwork created by fifty state court systems, twelve federal 
circuits that act in disconnected fashion (only rarely overseen 
by the U.S. Supreme Court), fifty state legislatures and sets of 
regulatory agencies, and myriad other actors. In short, health 
law verges on chaos—and often goes over the verge. Multiple 
doctrines are at war with each other, core values are in sharp 
conflict, and there is bitter disagreement over the basics of 
                                                          
 4. CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, BENDING THE 
CURVE: OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND IMPROVING VALUE IN U.S. 
HEALTH SPENDING (2007), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/EMBARGOED_FULL_REPORT_
Bending_the_Curve_optimized.pdf. 
 5. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
OECD HEALTH DATA 2009. 
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what reform of the American way of health care governance 
should aim to accomplish.6 This disagreement has paralyzed 
the politics of health reform.7 
Commentary on health care law often acknowledges this 
problem,8 yet rarely takes it seriously. Health law scholars are 
wont to criticize the field’s incoherence, then to will this 
incoherence away by urging one or another single, overarching 
solution. In so doing, they presume the existence of a few key 
decision-makers able to implement this solution by somehow 
exercising top-down authority over the law in their domains. 
Writers variously urge market-driven reform, more robust 
regulation, and an expanded role for government as health care 
payer. But putting any of these visions into effect would require 
health law’s myriad deciders to step in rhythm to a single beat. 
That, we contend, is the stuff of fantasy. 
The central challenge for health law reformers, in our view, 
is the impossibility of imposing any unifying, overarching 
vision. Commentators who assume this challenge away 
overlook health care law’s astonishing degree of fragmentation. 
They ignore health law’s myriad, disconnected decision-makers, 
competing stakeholders, and contradictory (but passionately-
felt) moral commitments. Rather than treating this 
fragmentation as something to be swept aside by some 
overarching vision that we all should embrace, would-be health 
law reformers should accept fragmentation, verging on chaos, 
as inevitable. To this end, we will offer some ideas about how 
aspiring reformers might try to navigate this fragmentation 
and perhaps even turn health law’s contradictory impulses 
toward reformist ends. 
In most fields of law, the presumption of top-down decision 
makers is a close-enough approximation to reality. The U.S. 
                                                          
 6. See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT passim (1996). 
 7. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON’S HEALTH 
SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 
8395, 133–63 (1996). 
 8. See Megan McArdle, The Healthcare Debate is a Kabuki Theatre of 
Incoherence, BUSINESS INSIDER, Nov. 23, 2009, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-healthcare-debate-is-a-kabuki-theatre-of-
incoherence-2009-11; see also John R. Graham, Another Incoherent Health-
Care Poll in the New York Times, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, June 22, 2009, 
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MTE5M2FlZTkyNGJiOTY5NTlmNT
kyMTQ0MjEzMzVlOTc. 
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Supreme Court holds sway over constitutional law, and various 
agencies set rules within their regulatory realms, subject to 
judicial review and legislative oversight. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) are classic examples within their 
respective fields of law. The law of health care provision in the 
US does not function this way. No single authority sets the 
rules or is in position to implement the proposals and 
paradigms that commentators urge. Health law is the product 
of many scattered deciders who act not in concert but in 
interdependent fashion. These scattered deciders have 
multiple, clashing understandings of what legal governance 
should aim to accomplish. No single understanding can prevail. 
Rather, health law exhibits the properties of an emergent 
system—a system with a design that arises from ongoing 
feedback among these deciders. Its design—its intelligence—
transcends these deciders. Indeed, it is a common feature of 
emergent systems that their component elements do their part 
absent awareness of their places in the larger scheme. 
Ants, for example, “decide” to forage or to fight or to ferry 
food from distant places based on pheromone levels they detect. 
They neither take orders from their superiors nor grasp their 
larger mission on the colony’s behalf. Our neurons do the same 
thing, receiving signals then firing to activate or suppress 
follow-on brain cells that participate in networks tied to 
perceiving and understanding and acting upon the world. 
Neurons, of course, have no sense of their larger networking 
mission; they simply follow the laws of chemistry and physics. 
The logic of our thoughts and behaviors emerges from this. The 
designs of cities, societies, and economies likewise emerge from 
the motives and actions of individuals who think they know 
what they are doing but who are mostly unaware of their roles 
in fashioning and sustaining neighborhoods, subcultures, 
industries or the other social forms that organize our collective 
lives. 
We are, of course, different from ants and neurons. We are 
more flexible, since our neural networks evolve in response to 
events, and we are, at times, more self-aware. But what we 
have in common with our remote six-legged relatives is that the 
intelligence of our social forms transcends our sense, while in 
the fray, of our motives and actions. The logic of American 
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health law is similarly emergent, for better and often for worse. 
Take for example, the tension between malpractice law’s 
reliance upon professional standards of care and the 
proposition that markets should permit consumers to pick from 
among different levels of care, an idea that is embedded in 
antitrust doctrine, and, to some degree, judicial interpretation 
of health insurance contracts. Commentators on health law 
typically treat this tension as a failure of coherence.9 Market-
orientated commentators complain that liability for breach of 
professional standards keeps health plans and providers from 
offering lower-cost care and coverage options.10 On the other 
hand, liberals, who object to tying medical care to ability to 
pay, defend professional standards as a floor below which levels 
of care should not fall.11 
Viewing health law as an emergent system yields a 
different understandingone that treats this apparent 
incoherence as a channel for feedback among scattered deciders 
with differing perspectives. A deeply felt commitment to health 
equity and to the ideal of life’s pricelessness animates tort law’s 
deference to professional standards of care. Were the law to 
utterly abandon its reliance on professional standards, it would 
detach itself from these concerns. This might undermine 
people’s belief in law’s responsiveness to their hopes and fears. 
Yet life, of course, is not priceless—the market price of life is 
probably about $100,000 per quality-adjusted life year,12 
resources are scarce, and Americans revere the market as the 
most efficient and least authoritarian way to manage scarcity. 
Antitrust and other doctrines that promote consumer choice in 
health care express this. The legal regimes that govern medical 
malpractice and restraints on competition therefore embody 
competing ideals to which Americans are inextricably 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., Anne Zieger, Antitrust Laws Could Hobble Healthcare 
Reform, FIERCE HEALTHCARE, May 27, 2009, 
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/antitrust-laws-could-hobble-healthcare-
reform/2009-05-27. 
 10. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE 
CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 146 (1995). 
 11. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health 
Care is Medically Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229 passim (1999) 
(urging reliance on professional standards to determine levels of care and 
health insurance coverage). 
 12. David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, The Value of Health: 1970–
1990, AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS, May 1998, at 97. 
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committed. 
From an emergent systems perspective, this is not a 
contradiction. It is an opportunity for mutual feedback among 
component systems that constitute health law. Antitrust 
lawyers who take a combative stance toward professional 
standards can stay true to their conviction, as can egalitarians 
that see health care allocation based on ability to pay as 
anathema. Both sides think they know what they are doing—
campaigning to make health law more consistent and to get it 
right by cleansing it of the pernicious influence of the opposing 
view. Both sides, meanwhile, participate in a larger process of 
which they may be only dimly aware, a process of feedback 
between legal schemes that sometimes sustains existing 
arrangements and that at other times pushes health care 
governance hard in one direction or another as scattered 
deciders take account of developments in neighboring suites of 
law. 
Myriad other feedback schemes shape the regulatory 
governance of health care. Some of these schemes involve 
classic tensions in American public life—between national and 
local governance (the struggle over ERISA pre-emption of state 
efforts to expand coverage13 is a case in point), equity and 
autonomy (the debate over the extent to which informed 
consent law should accommodate individuals’ varied 
preferences14 is illustrative), and public versus personal 
responsibility for finding shelter against life’s vicissitudes (this 
is the central theme of recurring battles over the scope of 
health insurance initiatives for the disadvantaged). 
Such feedback schemes enable the expression of values and 
concerns that are at odds with each other but deeply felt, to the 
point that health law cannot realistically discard them. Legal 
and regulatory actions that offend these values inspire 
responsesfrom the losing parties and from legal decision 
makers with different perspectives. Decision-makers charged 
with implementing different legal regimestort and contract, 
ERISA, antitrust, and many otherssend negative or positive 
feedback signals through their responses. 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of S.F., 512 F.3d 
1112 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, (No. 08-1515) (July 10, 2009). 
 14. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48–
84 (1984). 
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For instance, refusal by state judges to endorse contractual 
departures from professional standards of care in medical 
malpractice cases sends a dampening message to antitrust and 
other decision makers who are eager to advance the market 
model in the medical realm. Conversely, state courts’ growing 
willingness since the 1970s to permit insurers to deny coverage 
for physician-prescribed services on contract law grounds 
signals that their support for professional authority has 
diminished. The Supreme Court’s refusal to give full effect to 
the market model, even in the antitrust context (for example, 
the Justices’ acceptance of professional restrictions on price 
advertising15) may reflect its summing of these and other mixed 
signals, from many decision makers, about the comparative 
desirability of untrammeled competition and deference to 
professional norms. 
Consider Justice Souter’s mixed messages about the sweep 
of markets in the medical realm. In the year 2000, in Pegram v. 
Herdrich, he characterized clinical standards of care as the 
product of market-driven cost benefit trade-offs beyond the 
scope of regulatory oversight under ERISA.16 But just two 
years later, in Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, he portrayed 
medical standards of care as a matter of professional opinion, 
not contract.17 For some, this inconsistency merits scorn. It is 
poor judicial craftsmanship, pure and simple, or so it seems. 
But it is also a sign of the Court’s role as a processor of mixed 
messages about the role of markets and professionalism in 
health care governance. 
The Justices participate in overlapping networks of 
feedback involving health law’s myriad decision makers. In 
response to the varied signals the Justices receive, they rely 
upon competing models of medical governance, all of which 
have some legal force. So it is hardly surprising that the Court 
sends messages that don’t cohere. Consistency would require 
the Justices to discard large parts of health law, embodying 
values and concerns Americans are unwilling to abandon. 
Within the networks of decision-making that constitute health 
care law, negative feedback tends to support the status quo, 
                                                          
 15. California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 759 
(1999). 
 16. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–32 (2000). 
 17. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386 (2002). 
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and positive feedback tends to promote change. Novel judicial, 
regulatory, and legislative gambits typically provoke 
suppressive responses, but they sometimes catch fire, 
propagating to broader networks of decision-makers. 
The law’s embrace of the market paradigm is the highest 
profile case of this phenomenon. Isolated market-oriented 
initiatives in the 1970s—the Supreme Court’s abandonment of 
the “learned professions” exemption from antitrust law18 and 
Congressional passage of a law promoting HMOs19—triggered 
positive responses, probably boosted by rising skepticism 
toward professional authority. Other decision-makers picked 
up, then amplified the signal. The Federal Trade Commission 
began antitrust enforcement against health care providers,20 
state regulators backed away from “Certificate of Need” 
limitations on hospitals’ capital investment,21 and courts, as 
mentioned earlier, began allowing insurers to decline coverage 
for physician-prescribed care.22 
Preceding and parallel developments in “neighboring” 
doctrinal spaces widened the possibilities for propagation. Most 
of those who urged more robust informed consent requirements 
during the 1960s and 1970s didn’t mean to promote medical 
markets. But they did just that, by winning broader legal and 
cultural recognition for patient autonomy.23 This in turn 
primed courts’, regulators’, and the public’s receptivity to the 
competition paradigm.24 Likewise, for the Congress that 
enacted ERISA in 197425—in response to pension fund scandals 
                                                          
 18. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e (1982). 
 20. Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services 
Industry: What Does It All Mean?, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166, 167–
68 (1980); see, e.g., In re Medical Staff of Memorial Medical Ctr. 110 F.T.C. 541 
(1988); In re Preferred Physicians, Inc. 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988); In re Hospital 
Corp. of America 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985). 
 21. See Frank A. Sloan, Government and the Regulation of Hospital Care, 
AM. ECON. REV. 196, 198 (1982); Christopher J. Conover & Frank A. Sloan, 
Does Removing Certificate-of-Need Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care 
Spending?, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 455 (1998) (reviewing the effect of 
historical changes in certificate of need laws). 
 22. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000). 
 23. See e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 139–40 (1986). 
 24. See e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, The “Competition Revolution” in Health Care, 
7 HEALTH AFF. 5 (1988). 
 25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. 
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that shattered American workers’ confidence—the implications 
for health insurance were an afterthought.26 But by pre-
empting most state regulation of employee benefit plans (and 
substituting few minimum requirements of its own); ERISA 
largely deregulated the market for medical coverage. 
Out of many interwoven networks of deciders, health care 
law emerges. This self-organizing process hardly guarantees a 
governance system that serves us well. By way of analogy, 
emergence in biological systems generates tumors, seizures and 
other phenomena that careen out of control when the feedback 
mechanisms that maintain homeostasis fail. America’s 
worsening crises of cost and access,27 clinical mistakes that kill 
tens of thousands of patients a year,28 and the proliferation of 
treatments absent proof of their value29 strongly suggest that 
in health care law much has gone awry. How to intervene to 
make health law part of the solution—or, at the least, to keep 
law from making the problems worse—is a question that calls 
for attention to the dynamics of emergence. 
How might focus on the dynamics of emergence guide 
reformers’ efforts to reshape, or at least nudge, the law of 
health care provision? We want to suggest a few possibilities on 
                                                          
No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2007). 
 27. Todd P. Gilmer & Richard G. Kronick, Hard Times and Health 
Insurance: How Many Americans Will Be Uninsured by 2010? (web exclusive), 
28 HEALTH AFF. w573–w574 (2009). 
 28. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A 
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (executive summary) (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. 
Corrigan, & Molla S. Donaldson, eds.) (1999), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/html/to_err_is_human/reportbrief.pdf; see also Drew E. 
Altman et al., Improving Patient Safety—Five Years After the IOM Report, 351 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2041 (2004). But see Troyen A. Brennan et al., Accidental 
Deaths, Saved Lives, and Improved Quality, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405 
(2005) (suggesting that while the 1999 IOM report shed light on a major 
concern within American health care, it focuses too strongly on the concept of 
preventable individual accidental deaths rather than use of evidence-based 
medicine to improve quality of care). 
 29. See, e.g., ELLIOT FISHER ET AL., HEALTH CARE SPENDING, QUALITY, 
AND OUTCOMES: MORE ISN’T ALWAYS BETTER available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/Spending_Brief_022709.pdf (discussing 
overuse of clinical interventions without evidence of their efficacy); JOHN E. 
WENNBERG ET AL., THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 222 (1999), available at 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/atlases/99Atlas.pdf (discussing overuse use of 
treatments absent scientific proof of benefits and harms). 
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the access-to-care front. Most Americans say they support 
universal coverage. But political and legal obstacles that are 
manageable through emergence-oriented reform strategies 
have repeatedly stymied attempts to achieve it. A large barrier 
is ERISA preemption of state initiatives.30 Many of these state 
initiatives require employers to either cover their workers or 
pay into public funds to subsidize insurance; this raises the 
issue of whether ERISA preempts such state laws.31 Less 
tangible obstacles include ideological resistance to publicly 
supported coverage as incompatible with personal 
responsibility and the risk-aversion of health care stakeholders, 
who often oppose change that could disrupt cash flows upon 
which they have come to rely. 
Clearing the ERISA barrier to state-level reform efforts 
would open up a variety of potential evolutionary pathways 
toward nationwide universal coverage. States have seized the 
initiative on the health reform front with creative, bipartisan 
ideas about how to expand coverage.32 From a conventional 
health reform perspective, the prospect of 50 different state 
systems is anathema. A single national system, whether 
market-oriented or government-administered, would seem 
essential to avoid Byzantine bureaucratic and legal complexity. 
However, from a pragmatic perspective, perhaps incremental 
reform via state models should be promoted. Ideological and 
interest-group gridlock at the federal level makes national 
reform difficult, as recent reform battles have reminded us.33 
State-by-state progress, meanwhile, could build momentum 
toward nationwide insistence on universal coverage, so long as 
high-visibility state initiatives are seen as successful and, thus, 
worth propagating. 
                                                          
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
 31. Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and 
Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203 (2007). 
 32. See generally Joel C. Cantor et al., Challenges of State Health Reform: 
Variations in Ten States, 17 HEALTH AFF. 191 (1998); Richard P. Nathan, 
Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005); see also, John E. 
McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access 
Reform (web exclusive), 25 HEALTH AFF. 420 (2006) (detailing how the most 
well-known state health reform initiative is constructed). 
 33. Dan Eggen, Health-care Lobbyists Continue Spending Spree, THE 
WASHINGTON POST BLOG (Oct. 21, 2009, 5:00 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/health-care-reform/2009/10/health-
care_lobbyists_continue.html. 
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Similarities in design are likely to result from the 
propagation of successful state models along informal networks 
of influence. These similarities would ease administrative 
burdens. But if large employers or health plans become 
sufficiently concerned about the Balkanization of legal and 
regulatory requirements, they could press Congress and the 
White House for federalization of the emerging universal 
coverage system. They might well succeed, demonstrating the 
power of feedback mechanisms to transform health policy and 
law in circuitous fashion—and locking in a national 
commitment to medical coverage for all. Support for state 
initiatives is thus a wise gamble from an emergent systems 
perspective, even if one aspires, ultimately, to a federal regime 
of universal coverage. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that state-driven reform 
would lead to any particular model for expanding coverage. But 
more likely than not, one or a few prevailing models would 
emerge as the states’ experiences influence each other. Nor 
must state-level reform lead, in the end, to state governance of 
health insurance coverage. Congress and the White House 
could respond to state initiatives by imposing an overarching 
federal scheme. Were this to happen, state reforms would still 
have served a vital purpose by nudging the country toward 
universal coverage. 
This rationale favors legislative revision of ERISA to clear 
the way for state experimentation—and, in the meanwhile, 
judicial construction of ERISA to minimize preemption of state 
initiatives.34 There’s ample doctrinal space for such a judicial 
reading. The Supreme Court has said, in a case involving state 
regulation of hospital charges, ERISA’s pre-emptive provisions 
are to be read narrowly when they infringe traditional state 
power over health matters.35 Some lower court precedent poses 
a threat to state-level “pay or play” requirements,36 but the 
                                                          
 34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2007). 
 35. See N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659–62 (1995) (holding that state law requiring 
hospitals to collect higher payments from commercial insurers than from 
nonprofit Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans survives §514 preemption). 
 36. See e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that legislation by the Maryland General Assembly which 
called for employees to spend a certain percentage of their total payroll on 
health insurance costs or pay the amount to the state was preempted by 
ERISA). But see Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of S.F., 512 F.3d 
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accretion of state reform initiatives would put pressure on 
judges not to stymie legislators when neither Supreme Court 
precedent nor the plain language of ERISA requires it. 
Objections to publicly supported coverage on the ground 
that it is incompatible with personal responsibility pose a 
larger challenge. Denunciations of universal coverage as 
“socialism” or the like may be overwrought, but they’ve gained 
populist traction because of many Americans’ worries about 
subverting self-reliance.37 Commentators, advocacy groups, 
public officials, and others who favor government action to 
increase access have offered lots of counterarguments. This 
debate has been joined in American politics since Theodore 
Roosevelt urged national health insurance during his Bull 
Moose run for the presidency in 1912.38 There have been 
incremental steps forward—Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, 
Medicaid expansion during the ‘80’s, and SCHIP in 1997. Yet 
portrayals of public coverage as a handout and a step towards 
socialism have maintained their resonance. 
Universal coverage proponents have struggled to rebut this 
portrayal. But the logic of emergence suggests another 
approach, one that takes advantage of the tension between 
people’s commitments to universal coverage and self-reliance. 
Rather than ruing this tension, health policy progressives 
should harness its political energy by weaving individual 
responsibility and mutual obligation together into a new 
reciprocity of personal and public commitment to health.39 
This new reciprocity might start with an enhanced sense of 
individual obligation—to eat sensibly, exercise regularly, avoid 
smoking and otherwise care for ourselves. It ought to include 
an obligation to buy health insurance. Our failure to do these 
                                                          
1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a similar law survives ERISA preemption). 
 37. See, e.g., Editorial, Misinformation, Mayhem Mar Debate on Health 
Care, USA TODAY BLOG, (Aug. 10, 2009, 12:21 AM), 
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/08/our-opinion-misinformation-mayhem-
mar-debate-on-health-care.html; Sam Stein, Steele Calls Obama Health Care 
Socialism, Agrees This His Waterloo, HUFFINGTON POST, July 9, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/20/steele-calls-obama-
health_n_240989.html. 
 38. Kaiser Family Foundation, National Health Insurance—A Brief 
History of Reform Efforts in the U.S. (Focus on Health Reform series) (March 
2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf. 
 39. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care for All?, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173–75 
(2007). 
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things ought to carry consequences, like premium surcharges 
and a measure of embarrassment over personal behavior that 
adds health risk without corresponding social benefit. The 
state, in exchange, should offer some protection when self-
reliance falters. Americans who cannot afford coverage ought to 
be able to turn to their government for help in acquiring it. If 
the US is to come close to universal coverage, personal 
responsibility will probably need to play a larger role than it 
did in the mid-20th century welfare state. 
The risk-aversion of health care stakeholders is perhaps 
the least-appreciated obstacle to coverage expansion. Health 
care reform disrupts existing subsidies and revenue streams by 
replacing them with promised alternatives. Risk-averse 
stakeholders often oppose reform proposals even when the 
resulting disruptions are likely to yield net benefits by 
replacing current funding streams with larger subsidies and 
revenues. Foremost among the disruptions likely to ensue from 
coverage expansion (and its public financing) is the shift from 
veiled cross-subsidies to visible means of financing care for the 
less well off.40 Americans subsidize care for the medically 
indigent through a variety of mechanisms that few understand. 
These include extra payments from the Medicare Trust Fund to 
hospitals with large numbers of uninsured patients, as well as 
private insurance premiums set high enough to contribute to 
the cost of indigent care.41 Publicly sponsored coverage for the 
less well off would supplant these cross-subsidies with a high-
profile tax, an inviting political target. The prospect of these 
cross-subsidies’ disappearance or diminution alarms hospitals 
and clinics who fear that public funding for broader coverage 
won’t suffice to replace this bird in hand. 
Stakeholders’ concerns about the disruption of their 
revenue streams as the result of movement toward universal 
coverage are a large obstacle to reform. In California, these 
concerns proved fatal to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s 
                                                          
 40. See H.R.3962, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009). The 
House Democrats’ bill, unveiled on November 18, 2009, would impose a 40 
percent tax on so-called “Cadillac plans,” which have insurance premiums 
above $8,500 for an individual and $23,000 for a family. Those thresholds 
represent the total paid by both employer and employee. 
 41. See generally Gail R. Wilensky, Solving Uncompensated Hospital 
Care: Targeting the Indigent and the Uninsured, 3 HEALTH AFF. 50 (1984). 
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2007 reform plan.42 And these concerns need to be taken 
seriously. From a conventional policy wonk perspective, this 
disruption shouldn’t count. It is just a transition problem. If 
one or more universal coverage proposals represent an 
improvement over today’s tangled web of inefficient cross-
subsidies, it ought to be enacted, policy wonks and law 
professors like to say, unless a competing scheme would 
improve things even further. 
But from an emergent systems perspective, transitions are 
crucial periods, not merely details to be worked out 
bureaucratically and legally after new policies are chosen. 
Rather, transitions are the terrain that must be crossed to 
achieve policy ends. Obstacles have to be anticipated—
obstacles created by stakeholders, cumbersome bureaucratic 
structures, and extant legal regimes. Further, public 
perceptions are crucial, as is illustrated by voters’ resistance to 
new taxes even when these would supplant payroll deductions 
that cross-subsidize care for the poor. 
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson 
understood this last point when they insisted on characterizing 
working Americans’ contributions towards Social Security and 
Medicare as insurance premiums, not taxes. Aspiring architects 
of expanded medical coverage today would do well to fashion 
schemes that separate collection of general tax revenues from 
public financing of care for people unable to meet their own 
medical needs. This is more than just rhetoric; both promising 
political pathways and insurmountable obstacles to reform 
emerge from the structure of people’s perceptions about the 
options they confront. More generally, aspiring architects of 
reform should avoid large, immediate disruption of current 
financial arrangements, even when the policy case for 
disruption is powerful. Sudden disruption of settled 
expectations invites fierce political and legal resistance from 
                                                          
 42. Governor of the State of California, Governor’s Health Care Proposal 7 
(Jan. 8, 2007), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf. California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed to pay for expanded medical coverage in part 
by pooling current cross-subsidy streams and rechanneling them from 
hospitals and clinics to support insurance premiums for the less well-off. 
Health care providers, who receive these cross-subsidies, have fretted about 
the prospect that they could lose these cross-subsidies and still face a 
substantial uncompensated care burden, absent the achievement of universal 
coverage. 
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stakeholders—resistance that puts reform at risk. 
From an emergent systems perspective, getting reform 
right is more than a matter of preparing the blueprint for the 
best policy in the abstract. It requires charting a path through 
networks of political and legal influence. Policies that postpone 
the prospect of disruption—leaving open multiple, more 
gradual evolutionary possibilities—will tend to arouse less 
resistance. 
There is, for example, a strong public policy case for ending 
tax exemption of not-for-profit hospitals upon the advent of 
universal, comprehensive coverage.43 The prevailing rationale 
for property and income tax exemption of hospitals has long 
been that they provide for people unable to pay. Universal 
coverage would render this rationale obsolete. Elimination of 
these tax subsidies would make additional state and federal 
dollars available to support insurance for those unable to afford 
it. Redirecting public funds from subsidies for hospitals to 
coverage for the uninsured would both empower patients and 
better match public spending with clinical need. This all makes 
sense, at least to us;44 yet the not-for-profit hospital sector’s 
resistance to its loss of tax exemption weighs heavily against 
trying to do so as part of health reform. Exemption, even for 
hospitals that provide minimal charity care, has become a 
settled expectation. The industry is reluctant to give up this 
bird-in-hand. Enactment of universal coverage at either the 
state or federal level without the non-profit hospital sector’s 
support is difficult to imagine, so the demise of this otherwise 
unjustifiable subsidy isn’t worth demanding. The landscape of 
health care financing is crisscrossed with subsidy schemes like 
this one—hard to justify on policy grounds but built into settled 
expectations to the point that their elimination isn’t worth the 
political cost. 
Since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, opponents 
of publicly sponsored universal coverage have displayed a 
deeper intuitive awareness of the dynamics of emergence than 
have advocates of health insurance for all. A stunning example 
                                                          
 43. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and 
the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299 passim (1995). 
 44. But see Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The 
Behavior, Law and Ethics of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 
1408 (2003) (arguing that nonprofit hospitals supply social benefits that merit 
the tax exemption). 
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played out in 1993 as congressional Republicans scrambled to 
prepare for President Clinton’s anticipated health care reform 
juggernaut. Republican Senate and House leaders eyed 
plausible compromises that might have achieved near-
universal coverage with a reduced role for government. These 
compromises hewed to traditional Republican principles. They 
would have left open a wide playing field for competition 
between health plans, minimally restricted by federal 
regulators. 
But conservative strategist William Kristol looked beyond 
the policy logic of the possible deals, toward the longer-term 
implications of government-guaranteed coverage.45 For 
Republicans, he intuited, the implications of universal coverage 
were disastrous.46 Enactment of any publicly financed scheme 
to cover all would rekindle Roosevelt-era confidence in 
government as guarantor of personal security, undermining the 
broader Republican case for lower taxes and less government.47 
Conversely, utter defeat for health care reform on President 
Clinton’s watch would deliver a lasting blow to Americans’ 
belief in government’s ability to solve complex social 
problems—and to confidence in Democrats’ ability to deliver on 
their promises.48 
In a memo that quickly achieved iconic status among 
conservatives, Kristol urged Republicans to go all-out to kill 
health care reform.49 “There should be no deals, no carefully 
nuanced compromises,” Kristol argued. “The Clinton plan 
should come to nothing except disillusionment.”50 Swayed by 
Kristol’s analysis, House and Senate Republican leaders 
abandoned compromise alternatives in favor of a scorched-
                                                          
 45. Adam Meyerson, Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of 
the GOP, POL’Y REV, Winter 1994, at 14, 15; Thomas B. Edsall, Happy Hours, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A27. In an influential memo, Mr. Kristol wrote: 
“Any Republican urge to negotiate a ‘least bad’ compromise with the 
Democrats, and thereby gain momentary public credit for helping the 
president ‘do something’ about health care, should also be resisted. The plan 
should not be amended; it should be erased.” Id. 
 46. Meyerson, supra note 45, at x. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 15. 
 49. Theda Skocpol, The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan, 
HEALTH AFFIARS, Spring 1995, at 66, 75–76. 
 50. Id.; Meyerson, supra note 45, at x. 
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earth stance toward health care reform.51 By the fall of 1994, 
the Clinton plan had succumbed. Just a few months later, 
disillusioned voters delivered both houses of Congress to 
Republicans for the first time in forty years.52 Universal 
coverage disappeared from the national agenda for a decade, 
during which time the ranks of the uninsured grew by about a 
million a year. And more than that, Americans maintained 
their skepticism toward government’s ability to transform their 
lives for the better through grand social policy schemes. Kristol 
had gotten it right. 
Until, that is, 2009. Suddenly, out of sheer terror, as 
Barack Obama took the presidential oath in January, 
Americans looked to government with large expectations. 
Suddenly, as economic catastrophe loomed, Americans saw 
regulation as an urgent need. During the early months of 2009, 
pundits suggested that the cost of financial rescue would 
preclude comprehensive health reform, including universal 
coverage. But the opposite turned out to be the case. “Tea 
parties” & “town-hall” shoutfests aside, government’s sudden, 
large involvement in finance—with seemingly successful 
results (we’ve avoided a 2nd Great Depression)53—elevated 
Americans’ sense of what the state should attempt, in health 
care and other spheres. 
The reform bills that wended their way through the House 
and Senate in 2009—and the reform principles promoted by 
President Obama—displayed an acute sensitivity to the 
dynamics of emergence.54 Their organizing principle was the 
importance of minimizing disruption of established 
arrangements and settled expectations. To this end, these 
proposals left employment-based coverage in place. They 
pursued universal coverage by expanding Medicaid to reach 
lower-income Americans not now eligible for these programs 
                                                          
 51. Manish C. Shah & Judith M.Rosenberg, Health Care Reform in the 
103D CongressA Congressional Analysis, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 585, 609 
(1996). 
 52. Skocpol, supra note 49, at 67. 
 53. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: ADVANCING 
ECONOMIC STABILITY THROUGH TRANSPARENCY, COORDINATED OVERSIGHT 
AND ROBUST ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009). 
 54. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th 
Congress (as passed by House, November 7, 2009); America’s Healthy Future 
Act of 2009, S. 1796 111th Congress (2009). 
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and by subsidizing middle-income Americans’ purchase of 
private insurance. They avoided extending Medicaid and The 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to people 
at income levels within the marketing sights of private 
insurers. And the subsidies these bills promised for the 
purchase of private coverage offered a multibillion dollar 
benefit for insurers. The only likely, near-term “losers” were 
employers who do not now provide coverage: most of these 
proposals required employers to choose between offering 
insurance and paying a tax (or “fee”) to support the public 
subsidies.55 
These reform plans aimed to build momentum for coverage 
expansion by leveraging some existing arrangements and 
minimizing disruption to others. On the other hand, they 
opened pathways toward long-term, fundamental change. 
By establishing insurance exchanges to pool risk (and 
thereby reduce premiums) for individual insurance purchasers 
and small employer groups, they created an economically viable 
alternative to workplace-based coverage. Over time, this 
alternative purchasing mechanism could eclipse the workplace 
as America’s main source for private insurance. The ability of 
insurance exchanges to attract large numbers of purchasers 
and to offer many coverage choices would give them formidable 
advantages over employment-based plans. Vast purchasing 
pools could turn these exchanges into the “Amazon.coms” of 
medical coverage, able to out-perform all but the largest 
employers on price. 
Things could play out this way, but, then again, they may 
not. The bills that advanced through Congress in 2009 leave 
this question open. They treat the future of employment-based 
coverage as a thing to be decided in emergent fashion. Its 
persistence, or demise, will be determined by millions of 
Americans, acting as best they can to protect their families and 
themselves, with minimal attention to the policy impact of their 
choices. 
A more provocative possibility is the emergence of “single 
payer” coverage from these plans. This prospect mobilized the 
insurance industry—and some other health care 
                                                          
 55. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th 
Congress § 412 (as passed by House, November 7, 2009), America’s Healthy 
Future Act of 2009, S. 1796 111th Congress § 1306–1307 (2009). 
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stakeholders—to oppose the so-called “public option” with a 
vengeance. If a public plan were to fare better than its rivals in 
the competition for subscriberswhether because of lower 
administrative costs, better deals with doctors and hospitals, or 
other reasons—it could eventually come to overshadow them. 
This growth could feed back upon itself in positive fashion, by 
empowering the plan to obtain lower prices from providers, 
thereby crowding out private competitors. Absent 
Congressional intervention to limit the public plan’s 
monopsony power over providers or to otherwise restrain its 
growth, it could evolve into “single payer” coverage. This long-
run outcome—ideal in the eyes of some and nightmarish to 
others—is hardly foreordained. American antipathy toward 
government bureaucrats and one-size-fits-all solutions could 
limit the public plan’s appeal. 
Unfortunately, the reform proposals that made their way 
through Congress in 2009 offered much less to address the 
long-term growth of medical spending. To be sure, reforms that 
target administrative costs, the medical tort system, and the 
myriad inefficiencies in health care delivery have considerable 
potential to achieve cost reductions. Such reductions “ratchet 
down” the medical cost curve. But they do little to diminish its 
long-term, upward slope. If we are to “bend the curve” 
downward—that is, if we’re to substantially reduce the rate of 
health care cost growth in the decades ahead—we will need to 
break free from—or finesse—a political constraint that has so 
far prevented real progress toward long-term cost-containment. 
The constraint is this: weighing clinical benefits against 
costs and saying no to care that prolongs lives at too great an 
expense is essential, if we’re to control costs, yet unspeakable in 
politics and in the marketplace. The “R-word”—rationing—
remains taboo. Policy proposals that even suggest the setting of 
limits, or lay the foundations for it, arouse public ire. The 
“death panels” kerfuffle during the summer of 2009 
underscored this issue’s explosive potential, as did Rush 
Limbaugh’s claim earlier in the year that the economic 
stimulus bill passed by Congress in February created a 
“national health care rationing board.”56 
                                                          
 56. Lori Robertson, Doctor’s Orders?, FactCheck.org, Feb. 20, 2009, 
http://www.factcheck.org/2009/02/doctors-orders/ (“Radio host Rush Limbaugh 
repeated such charges on Feb. 10, telling his listeners that ‘if the cost of your 
treatment as a seasoned citizen is deemed by the government to be too 
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Political liberals have shown equal willingness to score 
points with the “R-word.” They have done so in response to 
Republican proposals to transform the Medicare entitlement 
into a fixed-value voucher for the purchase of private health 
insurance—and in response to proposals to end or cap the tax 
deductibility of employees’ and employers’ contributions toward 
health insurance premiums. Industry stakeholders (doctors, 
drug companies, and others) who stand to lose from limits on 
medical cost growth have taken similar advantage of this taboo. 
They’ve attacked limit-setting by both private and public 
payers as “rationing,” and this has gained them political 
traction. 
So long as society rejects the setting of limits, neither law 
nor markets can impose it. But changes in law and policy have 
some potential to nudge us toward greater willingness to weigh 
costs and benefits at the bedside. A robust program of 
comparative effectiveness research, greater price transparency, 
and the tying of insurance co-payment requirements to the 
clinical value of tests and treatments hold promise in this 
regard. These strategies are emergent in their orientation: they 
aim to open pathways toward cultural change that would make 
clinical limit-setting more acceptable. 
Creative steps are also possible in the meanwhile, before 
Americans are culturally ready to say “no” to potentially 
beneficial care on account of cost. Emergent systems thinking 
suggests an evolutionary strategy, anchored in people’s 
different expectations about pricey treatments that are 
available now and that might arise as medicine advances. Most 
Americans bristle at being denied today’s state-of-the-art care 
on account of cost. But they are not angry at doctors or health 
plans for failing to provide access to the nanotechnologies and 
micro-electronics of, say, the mid-21st century. They are not 
upset because they don’t get the care “Dr. McCoy” delivers 
during cable TV reruns of “Star Trek.” There’s a cost-control 
opportunity here that doesn’t depend on wide-spread 
willingness to ration care. If we rein in the development of 
ever-more-expensive technology that yields small marginal 
benefits, we can bend the health care cost curve downward 
without saying “no” to identified patients. 
                                                          
expensive based on how much longer you have to live, then you don’t get 
treated.’”). 
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We can do so by shrinking the huge premiums we pay 
doctors and hospitals’ for doing invasive, technology-intensive 
procedures, compared to what we pay them for counseling 
patients or delivering biologically-powerful but minimally-
invasive treatments. This won’t save much money now, since 
doctors’ fees are only a small fraction of health spending. But it 
will diminish doctors’ and hospitals’ incentives to adopt the 
clinical interventions that are the main drivers of medical 
costs—ever more sophisticated technologies that achieve only 
small clinical benefits. 
A concern here is the risk of discouraging real 
breakthroughs—advances that yield high value, relative to 
cost. But major breakthroughs tend to result from leaps in 
biological understanding of disease—advances that open the 
way for elegant, decisive interventions. Penicillin, which 
destroys bacterial cell walls, is the classic example. A more 
recent case is the revolution in our understanding of lipid 
metabolism, which opened the way for development of the 
statins, drugs taken by millions of Americans to slow the 
growth of artery-clogging plaque. Therapies that target 
pathophysiology in such elegant fashion tend to be relatively 
cheap, once the basic science that undergirds them has been 
paid for. By contrast, our most costly treatments—those that 
Lewis Thomas famously termed “half way technologies”57 —
tend to rest on comparatively crude understandings of the 
biology of disease. They are, paradoxically marvels of 
engineering, electronics, and materials science, and of modest, 
often minimal medical benefit. Examples include drug-coated 
stents designed to keep atherosclerotic arteries open, high-
technology life support, and last-ditch radiation and 
chemotherapy regimens meant mainly to sustain hope. 
Such treatments account for much of the medical spending 
that occurs in the last months of life. They are expensive 
because they are both technology-intensive and clinically 
indecisive. Their inability, in most cases, to make more than a 
modest therapeutic difference leads, perversely, to their 
intensive and sustained (rather than one-shot) use. In 
medicine, as in warfare, decisive victory is cheaper than a 
drawn-out struggle. 
Reducing the rewards available to doctors and hospitals for 
                                                          
 57. LEWIS THOMAS, LIVES OF A CELL 31–37 (1975). 
BLOCHE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:07 AM 
2010] HEALTH CARE REFORM 215 
 
adoption of “half-way” technologies will, in turn, diminish 
investment in efforts to develop them. Venture capitalists and 
investment bankers will be less likely to take a chance on them. 
Firms will adjust their research and development budgets 
accordingly. Unidentified future patients would forgo some 
therapeutic benefits. But popular ire over denial of beneficial 
care wouldn’t come into play, since the treatments “withheld” 
don’t exist. This strategy is emergence-oriented in two ways. 
First, it exploits openings for relatively modest changes in 
current law. It seeks out, and aims to exploit, non-linear 
relationships between legal change and real-world impact. 
Second, it anticipates actors’ adjustments to changed 
incentives—and to other actors’ adaptations. 
The emergent systems perspective makes sense of the 
seeming chaos that besets American health law and policy. It 
cautions us that no single “grand theory” of health care 
governance will or can triumph over others. It empowers health 
reformers to develop pragmatic agendas for change by looking 
for evolutionary possibilities immanent in current law, 
institutions, politics, and culture. Health law’s fragmentation 
and incoherence are large obstacles to urgently-needed change. 
But they reflect the ongoing collision of values and interests 
that shape the health sphere’s legal governance. Whether we 
can avert health care’s threat to our nation’s solvency while 
extending twenty-first century medicine’s benefits equitably to 
all will turn on our ability to seize the opportunities this 
collision engenders. 
 
